This paper challenges the widely accepted stylized fact that CEOs in the United States are paid significantly more than their foreign counterparts. Using CEO pay data across 14 countries with mandated pay disclosures, we show that the US pay premium is economically modest and primarily reflects the performance-based pay demanded by institutional shareholders and independent boards. Indeed, we find no significant difference in either level of CEO pay or the use of equity-based pay between US and non-US firms exposed to international and US capital, product, and labor markets. We also show that US and non-US CEO pay has largely converged in the 2000s. The findings are robust to alternative methods for adjusting the risk of equity-based pay.
traded firms in these countries. Our sample includes firms from both Anglo-Saxon and continental European countries, which have significant differences in corporate governance arrangements.
We show that the conventional wisdom is wrong. We find that the US pay premium is economically modest: US CEOs earn an average of 26% more than their foreign counterparts in 2006, far less than the 100% or 200% premiums documented in the (limited) academic research. In reaching this estimate of the premium, we control not only for the usual firmspecific characteristics (e.g., industry, firm size, stock price volatility and performance, growth opportunities) but also for two sets of characteristics that systematically differ across countries: ownership and board structure. Compared to non-US firms, US firms tend to have higher institutional ownership and more independent boards, factors that we find to be associated with both higher pay and increased use of equity-based pay. In addition, shareholdings in US firms tend to be less dominated by "insiders" (such as large-block family shareholders), factor associated with lower pay and reduced use of equity-based compensation. While institutions typically press for tighter links between pay and shareholder performance as a monitoring mechanism, firms with large blockholders do not need to rely as much on (expensive) incentive pay. Moreover, to the extent that insiderownership is high because of CEO ownership, such executives are primarily rewarded and motivated by their ownership and not their pay. We also control for the effects of CEO characteristics (e.g., age, tenure, education, past experience), concluding that these factors do not help explain international differences in pay.
We also find that US CEOs receive a higher fraction of their compensation in the form of stock and options. Risk-averse CEOs will naturally demand a pay premium for accepting the increased risk of equity-based pay (e.g., Hall and Murphy (2002) ). Our 26% US pay premium estimate is therefore not the appropriate measure of international pay differences from the perspective of risk-averse and undiversified CEOs who presumably do not hedge the risk of their pay packages and who are directly or indirectly forced to hold a undiversified portfolio (laden with unvested company stock and options). We estimate risk-adjusted CEO pay using two alternative approaches: (1) the riskless amount of compensation CEOs would accept in exchange for their risky compensation (Hall and Murphy (2002) ); and (2) observed compensation less the risk premium CEOs would demand for holding an undiversified portfolio (Conyon, et al. (2011) ). We find that risk adjustments reduce but do not eliminate observed US pay premiums unless we also control for differences in ownership and board structures.
We then explore the factors contributing to the convergence of CEO pay practices internationally. Many of the firms in our non-US sample compete in the global market for capital, customers, and managerial talent. We show that there is not a significant difference in CEO pay between US firms and non-US firms exposed to international markets. We classify non-US firms as "Internationalized" if they are included in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) All Country World Index or have a high fraction of shares held by foreign investors. Similarly, the difference is insignificant when US firms are compared with non-US firms that have a high fraction of foreign sales and internationally diverse boards. Additionally, we show that for "Americanized" non-US firms exposed to US capital markets (firms cross-listed in US exchanges and with a high fraction of shares held by US institutions) and product and labor markets (firms that have acquired assets in the US and firms with a high fraction directors who also sit on boards of US firms) the CEO pay is similar to that of US CEOs.
We argue that these non-US firms implement US-style compensation packages to attract global managerial talent, customers and investors. Foreign firms attempting to attract executives in competition with equivalent US firms will need to offer packages that are competitive with US levels, including large grants of stock and options and high overall levels of expected total compensation. Moreover, companies cross-listed on US exchanges benefit from "bonding" themselves to legal, regulatory, and capital market requirements of the US (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) ). One of those mechanisms could be implementing US-style compensation packages that align executive incentives more with shareholder interests through more equity-based pay, which could be important in attracting US and other foreign minority investors. This is direct evidence that market forces lead to the convergence of non-US CEO pay to US levels. (14%). We analyze the time series of the determinants of CEO pay and conclude that an increase in institutional ownership, especially by foreign-based institutions, seems to be the main factor associated with the convergence in CEO pay to US levels over time.
Overall, our evidence is inconsistent with the view that US CEO pay is "excessive" when compared to that of their foreign counterparts (as in Bebchuk, et al. (2002) and others), 1 The time series evidence relies on a smaller sample because of time trends in disclosure rules. but rather reflects tighter links between CEO pay and shareholder performance in US firms.
First, we show that the US pay premium is modest after controlling for firm, ownership, board, and CEO characteristics. Second, we demonstrate that it is misleading to examine cross-sectional or cross-country differences in the level of pay in isolation, without also examining differences in the structure of pay, namely the use of equity-based compensation.
In fact, the firm, ownership, and board characteristics associated with higher pay are those associated with a larger fraction of equity-based pay. Third, we find that CEO pay levels and the use of equity-based compensation are positively related to variables routinely used as proxies for better monitoring and better governance, namely institutional ownership and board independence. If US firms had poor governance, we would expect US CEOs to pay themselves higher "safe" base salaries instead of self-imposing higher performance-based pay. Fourth, our findings suggest that the observed US CEO pay premium reflects compensating differentials for the equity-based pay increasingly demanded by internationally diverse boards and shareholders. We find evidence that foreign and US institutional shareholders are linked to a greater use of equity-based pay and higher pay levels in non-US firms in which they invest. Finally, the convergence of US and non-US CEO pay levels since 2003 seems to be explained by the convergence of ownership structures and globalization of capital markets.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 summarizes prior evidence on international pay differences and describes our data sources. Section 3 analyzes the level and structure of 2006 CEO pay in the 14 countries with mandated pay disclosures, including an analysis of "riskadjusted" equity-based pay. Section 4 examines the impact of internationalization and Americanization of CEO pay for non-US firms. Section 5 analyzes time trends in observed US premiums from 2003 to 2008. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Background and Data Sources

The US pay premium: What we thought we knew
Whereas the US has required detailed disclosures on executive compensation since the 1930s (with significantly expanded disclosure rules introduced in 1978, 1993, and 2006) , the majority of other countries have historically required reporting at most the aggregate cash compensation for the top-management team, with no individual data and little information on the prevalence of equity or option grants. 2 Indeed, much of what we know about international differences in CEO pay has been based on Towers Perrin's biennial Worldwide Total Remuneration reports, utilized by Abowd and Bognanno (1995) , Abowd and Kaplan (1999) , Murphy (1999) , and Thomas (2008) and others. These international comparisons are not based on "data" per se, but rather depict the consulting company's estimates of "competitive" pay for a representative CEO in an industrial company with an assumed amount in annual revenues, based on questionnaires sent to consultants in each country. While crudely controlling for industry and firm size, it is impossible using these surveys to control for other factors that might explain the US pay premium, such as ownership and board structure, as well as for individual CEO characteristics.
Studies of the US pay premium using CEO-level data have largely been limited to comparisons between the US and Canada (which mandated US-style pay disclosures in 1993) or the UK (since 1995). 3 Based on data from 1993 to 1995 , Zhou (2000 shows that US CEOs earned more than double their Canadian counterparts. Conyon and Murphy (2000) show that US CEOs earned almost 200% more than UK CEOs in 1997, after controlling for industry, firm size, and a variety of firm and individual characteristics (though not ownership or board structure), while Conyon, et al. (2011) show that the US versus UK pay premium (before adjusting for the risk associated with undiversified portfolios) had fallen to 40% by
2003.
The disclosure situation has improved over the past decade. Regulations mandating disclosure of executive pay were introduced in Ireland and South Africa in 2000 and in Australia in 2004. In May 2003, the European Union (EU) Commission issued an "Action Plan" recommending that all listed companies in the EU report details on individual compensation packages, and that EU member countries pass rules requiring such disclosure.
By 2006, seven EU members (in addition to the United Kingdom and Ireland) had mandated CEO-level disclosure: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Sweden. 4 In addition, although not in the EU, Norway also adopted EU-style disclosure rules, and Switzerland demanded similar disclosure for the "highest-paid" executive.
Data sources
In this paper, we use data from the recently expanded disclosure rules to conduct a comprehensive international comparative analysis of the compensation for CEOs in all countries with detailed individual disclosure of CEO pay. 5 Table 1 reports the sample size and sources for the data, as well as summary statistics for the level and structure of CEO pay in each country.
Our primary data source on compensation for US CEOs is Standard and Poor's (S&P's) ExecComp database, while our primary source for CEOs of firms based outside the United States is BoardEx, compiled by the UK-based firm Management Diagnostics Limited.
Together, these two sources (identified as "BoardEx & Exec" in Table 1) account for 2,899 of the 3,263 firms in our sample. BoardEx is the leading database on board composition of publicly listed firms, and includes detailed biographic information on individual executives and board members in nearly 50 countries, including countries that do not have mandatory disclosure requirements for executive compensation. In addition to providing biographic information, BoardEx also includes detailed compensation data for top executivesincluding salaries, other pay, bonuses, payouts under long-term plans, option grants, and share grants.
To supplement the BoardEx data, we manually collect 2006 pay data from company filings for the largest firms in countries with pay-disclosure requirements but low BoardEx coverage, using annual reports, proxy statements (or their equivalent, such as management information circulars in Canada), and SEC Form 20F for foreign companies that are crosslisted in the United States. Specifically, we built a sample of firms in each country to ensure that we could cover at least the 30 largest publicly listed firms in that country ranked by market capitalization, or a cumulative 80% of that country's stock market capitalization in 2006. For Australia, Canada, and South Africa (where BoardEx has coverage on board composition and biographical information but scanty pay data), we manually collect compensation data. For our manually collected data, we value stock grants using the grantdate market value and option grants using the grant-date Black-Scholes value. 6 Ultimately, as reported in Table 1 , 364 firms with manually collected data are included in our final sample.
For US firms, we use ExecuComp rather than data from BoardEx to maintain comparability with the existing literature on US CEO pay. However, two aspects of BoardEx's compensation calculation deserve special mention. First, instead of providing grant-date values for stock option grants, as in ExecuComp and our manually collected data, BoardEx computes the value of options granted using the closing stock price on the last trading day of the fiscal year rather than the stock price on the grant date. Since 2006 was a generally positive year for stock markets in the countries included in our study, valuing options using fiscal year-end stock prices (a la BoardEx) produces a slightly higher value than using grant-date prices. Second, for performance share plans (in which the number of restricted shares awarded is based on realized performance), BoardEx computes the value based on the maximum (rather than the target or minimum) shares that can be awarded under the plan, again multiplied by the end-of-fiscal-year closing stock price. In unreported results, we find that measuring pay for US CEOs using BoardEx rather than ExecuComp does not alter the main findings of our study.
We exclude firms without complete compensation data, and also exclude firms that cannot be matched to Datastream/Worldscope, which is our source for firm financial and stock market data. We match the firms in our sample to Datastream using CUSIP codes for U.S. firms and SEDOL or ISIN codes for non-U.S. firms, and finally manually using company names. Finally, to reduce the impact of BoardEx's oversampling of small UK firms, we restrict our analysis to companies with 2005 revenues in excess of $100 million.
As reported in Table 1 , after these exclusions, our final sample consists of 1,648 US CEOs and 1,615 CEOs from 13 countries outside the US. Our sample firms accounted for approximately 90% of the market capitalization of all Datastream-covered firms in the US, and 83% of the market capitalization of all Datastream-covered firms in the 13 non-US countries. 6 In valuing options, we use the company-reported fair value if available, and otherwise follow ExecuComp's pre-2006 valuation methodology as closely as possible. In particular, options are valued using the Black and Scholes (1973) formula with the following inputs: (1) standard deviation of 60-month stock returns (or as many months as possible) for the volatility; (2) average three-year dividend yield; (3) risk-free rate on government bonds issued in each country with a maturity approximating 70% of the option maturity; (4) exercise price equals market price; and (5) expiration date of 70% of the full maturity (as a partial adjustment for early exercise).
In our analyses of CEO pay in Table 1 (and all our regression analyses below), we exclude 116 US and 135 non-US CEOs serving in their first year to avoid data anomalies reflecting compensation for multiple positions for CEOs promoted internally, and partialyear compensation and signing bonuses or grants for CEOs hired from outside. Therefore, our analyses below are based on a final sample of 1,532 US CEOs and 1,480 non-US CEOs. 7 Table 1 also reports the summary statistics of the level and structure of CEO pay in each country. All monetary values are converted into US dollars using the relevant exchange rate as of the close of the year. We find our primary findings to be unaffected when we use the purchasing power parity (PPP) factor in 2006 to adjust CEO pay or measure total pay relative to the average worker wage in each country. As shown in Table 1 , the average and median pay for US CEOs ($5.5 million and $3.3 million, respectively) is about double the average and median pay for non-US CEOs ($2.8 million and $1.6 million, respectively).
Salaries account for 28% of total pay for CEOs in the US, a smaller portion of than in any other country. The average across the other countries is 46%. Similarly, equity-based pay (consisting of restricted stock, stock options, and performance shares) account, on average, for 39% of total pay for US CEOs, a higher percentage than in any other country. The non-US average is 22%. The differences in the level and structure of pay for US versus non-US CEOs in Table 1 are all highly statistically significant.
The Level and Structure of Pay for US and Non-US CEOs
The US pay premium
The summary statistics in Table 1 suggest that US CEOs receive about double the pay of their foreign counterparts, but this calculation does not control for industry and especially firm size, documented to be an important determinant of the level of executive compensation (Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) , Kostiuk (1990) and Murphy (1999) ). In addition to industry and firm size, we consider four groups of potential controls: firm characteristics empirically known to affect the level of CEO pay based on prior evidence in US studies; ownership characteristics known to be systematically different in US versus non-US firms; board characteristics also systematically different in US versus non-US firms; and individual CEO characteristics. Detailed descriptions and data sources for these variables are included in Appendix A, and summary statistics by country are provided in Appendix B. We winsorize some firm-level variables (leverage, Tobin's Q, and stock return volatility) at the 1% level. Table 2 reports averages for the control variables in US and non-US firms, along with the t-statistic testing the difference in means between the two samples. As shown in the table, the US firms in our sample are not significantly larger than the non-US firms, but are less leveraged and have higher stock price volatilities and Tobin's Q. In addition, insider ownership (by executives, directors, and large blockholders) is significantly lower in the United States, while institutional ownership is significantly higher in the United States.
American boards are slightly smaller and significantly more independent, but are much more likely to have CEOs who also assume the title of Chairman. In terms of CEO characteristics, when compared to non-US CEOs, the US CEOs tend to be older, more experienced, better educated, and more likely to have been promoted into their positions rather than hired externally. Table 3 presents results examining the US pay premium after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics. In columns (1)- (4) 
Our main variable of interest is the "US dummy," which evaluates the pay-level differential of US-based top executives over those from other countries. The OLS regression includes fixed effects for 12 Fama-French industries, and standard errors are clustered at the country level to take into account the fact that residuals may not be independent within a country. 8
Column (1) of Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation (1) controlling only for industry and prior-year sales, similar in spirit to the survey-based estimates from Towers Perrin. 9 There is a strong theoretical justification for a positive relation between CEO pay and firm size. Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1982) argue that the marginal product of managerial ability increases with firm size, so that it is optimal to assign the most talented managers to the largest firms. Such "assortative matching" produces equilibrium wages that are convex in ability, such that small increases in ability can lead to large increases in wages. Gabaix and Landier (2008) extend Rosen's model by showing that the equilibrium wage of a CEO will 8 A concern with OLS regressions is that the distribution of CEO pay may be skewed. Our main results are unchanged when we use median regressions (untabulated), which is also more robust to the presence of outliers. 9 We obtain similar findings when we measure firm size using total assets or market capitalization.
depend not only on firm size, but also on the size distribution of all firms in the relevant market: as the average firm becomes larger, competition for scarce managerial talent will bid up compensation.
In column (1) of In column (2) of Table 3 we introduce other (prior-year) firm-level characteristics routinely used in CEO pay regressions and similar to those used in the US-UK comparisons by Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Conyon, et al. (2011) : leverage, Tobin's Q, stock-return volatility, and stock returns. CEO pay is typically expected to be positively related to Tobin's Q, using the latter as either a measure of investment opportunities (requiring a more capable CEO and riskier pay, both which will increase pay), or an indicator of past performance (leading to a higher level of pay for CEOs contributing to that performance). The volatility of stock returns is typically expected to be positively related to pay, since CEOs may demand risk premiums for serving in riskier environments. 11 Similarly, leverage increases the riskiness of equity-based compensation, also leading to risk premiums and higher levels of CEO pay. Finally, stock returns are included to capture the expected effect of prior-year performance on current pay levels. 12 As shown in column (2) of Table 3 , CEO pay is positively and significantly related to leverage, Tobin's Q, and stock returns (as expected), and negatively and significantly related 10 We obtain a similar estimate of the US pay premium when using propensity score matching methods. We match each non-US firm to a US firm by industry and a "propensity-score" estimated using a probit regression that gives the likelihood that a firm with given characteristics is from outside the US. 11 In fact, the relation between volatility and pay is theoretically ambiguous. If the volatility reflects noise in the CEO's effect on firm performance, then higher volatility will lead to lower pay-performance sensitivities, which can lead to either higher or lower variability of CEO pay (which in turn will affect expected pay); see Lazear and Rosen (1981) . However, if the volatility reflects volatility in CEO marginal productivities, CEOs in more volatile environments will have higher pay-performance sensitivities and higher average pay (Zábojník (1996 ), Prendergast (2002 and Edmans and Gabaix (2011) ). In addition, our definition of total compensation includes the Black-Scholes value of options, providing a potential mechanical link between volatility and pay. 12 The coefficient on this variable does not measure the relation between pay and performance (since that would require either a time-series of data on realized compensation and measures of the portfolio of stock and option holdings).
to the volatility of stock returns. Moreover, the coefficient on the US dummy of 0.629 in column (2) suggests an implied US pay premium of 88%, which is higher than the 79% premium when controlling only for sales and industry. Therefore, the US pay premium is apparently not explained by differences in capital structure, growth opportunities, performance, and volatility.
Column (3) of Table 3 includes controls for ownership structure. As we have noted in Table 2 , insiders hold a larger fraction of the shares in non-US firms than in US firms, reflecting the relative importance of family-or government-controlled firms outside of the United States (La Porta, et al. (1999) ). We expect a negative relation between CEO pay and insider ownership for two reasons. First, to the extent that insider ownership is high because of CEO ownership, such executives are primarily rewarded and motivated by their ownership and not their compensation. Second, to the extent that insider ownership is high because of large blockholders, they can monitor and direct the activities of executives without relying on (expensive) incentive compensation.
While insider ownership is higher outside the United States, Table 2 shows that institutions hold a significantly larger fraction of the shares in US firms than in non-US firms. We expect that institutions will press for tighter links between pay and shareholder performance (which will generally raise pay), and therefore expect a positive relation between CEO pay and institutional ownership. Hartzell and Starks (2003) focus on the level and concentration of institutional holdings (the fraction held by the top five institutions) and find that higher institutional holdings are associated with higher use of equity-based compensation, which they interpret as evidence that institutions play a monitoring role.
As shown in column (3) of Table 3 , CEO pay is negatively related to insider ownership, and positively related to institutional ownership. In particular, the coefficients on the ownership variables suggest that a 10% increase in insider and institutional holdings is associated with an 8% decrease and 3% increase in CEO pay, respectively. Coupled with our results in columns (5) and (6) (discussed below) that the use of equity-based incentive compensation decreases with insider holdings and increases with institutional holdings, these results are consistent with the interpretation that insider holdings substitute for equity-based pay, while institutions press for higher pay for performance. Moreover, controlling for ownership structure reduces the coefficient on the US dummy to 0.268, implying a reduction in the US pay premium from 88% in column (2) to 31% in column (3).
Although both insider ownership and institutional ownership are significant determinants of the level of CEO pay, untabulated results suggest that institutional ownership accounts for most of the decline in the estimated US pay premium between column (2) and column (3) of Table 3 . In particular, adding only insider ownership to column (2) reduces the coefficient on the US dummy variable from 0.629 to 0.495 (suggesting a reduction in the US pay premium from 88% to 64%), while adding only institutional ownership reduces the coefficient from 0.629 to 0.330 (a reduction in the US pay premium from 88% to 39%).
Column (4) of Table 3 includes controls for board structure, also seen in Table 2 to differ significantly between US and non-US firms. 13 The theoretical prediction of the effect of the composition of the board on CEO pay is somewhat ambiguous, depending on whether a heavier reliance on independent and experienced boards will reduce pay through more effective monitoring, or increase pay through increased reliance on incentive compensation.
As shown in column (4), we find that CEO pay is positively related to both the fraction of independent directors on the board, and to the average number of boards on which directors sit. 14 Controlling for board structure (in addition to firm and ownership characteristics) reduces the coefficient on the US dummy to 0.230, implying a US pay premium of 26%.
Adding only board-structure variables to column (2) reduces the US pay premium from 88%
to 66%. Table 3 with the "US dummy" replaced by a set of 14 country dummies. Panel B controls for industry, firm characteristics, ownership, and board characteristics, based on the specification in column (4) of Table 3 . The pay composition percentages are defined as the average composition across all CEOs for each country based on Table 1 . Panel A shows that US CEOs earn substantially more than non-US CEOs controlling only for size and industry.
However, in Panel B, after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics, we find effective parity in CEO pay levels among Anglo-Saxon nations (United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, and Canada) and also Germany, Italy and Switzerland.
In addition, we also consider differences in individual CEO characteristics as suggested by Table 2 , such as age, tenure, external hire dummy and college degree dummy. Column (1) 13 The sample size for column (4) is approximately 10% smaller than in column (1), reflecting observations dropped when BoardEx board data are unavailable. The results in columns (1)- (3) are not affected when restricting the sample to the 2,714 firms in column (4). 14 Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) also find that CEO pay increases with a measure of outside board memberships (which they interpret as directors being "too busy" to monitor the CEO). They also find that CEO pay decreases with the fraction of insiders on the board, which is consistent with our results in Table 3. of Table 4 analyzes differences in pay levels and structures for US and non-US CEOs after controlling for CEO characteristics, in addition to all the firm, ownership, and board characteristics (coefficients not shown) as in column (4) of Table 3 . We measure CEO characteristics based on employment histories and personal attributes contained in BoardEx.
The sample size is slightly reduced because individual CEO characteristics are not available for some of our hand-collected compensation data in Canada, Australia, and South Africa.
Data definitions for these variables are provided in Appendix A. Column (1) shows that the CEO characteristics, taken individually and jointly using an F-test, are not significantly related to the level of CEO pay. The implied US pay premium of 25% in column (1) of Table   4 is essentially unchanged compared to the 26% premium estimated in column (4) of Table   3 . Given the statistical insignificance of CEO characteristics -coupled with the reduction in available observations -we ignore CEO characteristics throughout the remainder of the paper.
The US equity pay premium
One of the primary determinants of CEO expected pay levels is the riskiness of the pay package, which is only captured indirectly by firm and industry characteristics in equation
(1). As discussed in detail in Section 3.3. below, we expect that CEOs at companies with riskier pay will receive higher expected levels of pay to compensate for the increased risk. In columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 , we estimate the following cross-sectional Tobit regression on 2006 pay structures:
where "Equity Pay" is defined as the grant-date value of stock and options, and firm characteristics are the same as in column (4) of Table 3 . Similar to columns (1)- (4) of Table   3 , the Tobit regressions include controls for 12 Fama-French industries with standard errors clustered at the country level. As in our earlier regressions, our main variable of interest is the "US dummy," which evaluates the difference in the use of incentive pay for US and non-US CEOs; we call the coefficient on this dummy variable the "US equity pay premium".
Column (5) of Table 3 , which controls only for industry and firm size, suggests a US equity pay premium of 22%. This is slightly larger than the 17% implied from the summary statistics in Table 1 , where equity-based pay accounted for 39% and 22% of total pay for US and non-US firms, respectively. However, after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics in column (6) of Table 3 , the US equity pay premium falls to a statistically insignificant 6%, implying only a relatively modest increased use of equity-based pay for US CEOs. Moreover, column (6) shows that the firm characteristics associated with higher pay are generally also associated with a higher use of performance-based compensation.
Importantly, both the level of CEO pay and the use of incentive compensation are positively related to institutional ownership and the fraction of independent directors, and negatively related to insider ownership. Combined with results in columns (3) and (4), these findings suggest that the reduction in the US pay premium comes from the performance-based pay demanded by institutional shareholders and more independent boards.
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 decompose equity pay into its components:
compensation in the form of stock and stock options. We find that there is no statistically significant difference between US and non-US CEOs in terms of use of stock but there is a significantly higher use of stock options for US CEOs, even after controlling for firm, ownership and board characteristics.
Column (2) of Table 4 analyzes the differences in US and non-US pay structures after controlling additionally for individual CEO characteristics. Older CEOs receive less of their compensation in the form of stock and options, while more educated CEOs receive more equity-based pay; none of the other CEO characteristics are significantly related to the structure of pay. The coefficient on the US dummy remains insignificant.
Risk-adjusted CEO pay
In comparing the level of CEO pay across companies and countries, it is important to distinguish between two different valuation concepts: the cost to the company of granting the compensation and the value to the CEO from receiving that compensation. Our measure of total compensation is meant to approximate the grant-date opportunity cost to shareholders of the CEO's pay package. However, it does not approximate the value of the package from the perspective of a risk-averse and undiversified CEO who presumably does not hedge the risk of the package. Although the 2006 pay differences for US versus non-US CEOs are economically modest after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics, the results in Table 3 nonetheless suggest that US CEOs are paid more than their foreign counterparts, and receive a greater share of their compensation in equity-based compensation. Since risk-averse CEOs will naturally demand a "risk premium" for accepting stock or stock options in lieu of safer forms of compensation, it is possible that the US pay premium reflects a compensating differential for the increased risk of US pay packages.
Indeed, Conyon, et al. (2011) conclude that adjusting for risk plausibly explains the observed 2003 pay differences between US and UK CEOs.
While there is general agreement that risk-averse CEOs will demand a premium for accepting risky compensation, there is no single accepted methodology on how to measure the risk premium. Following Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991), Hall and Murphy (2002) propose measuring the value of non-tradable stock or options to an undiversified riskaverse CEO as the amount of riskless cash compensation the CEO would exchange for the stock or options, based on various assumptions regarding CEO risk aversion and outside wealth. Applying this method to our data allows us to create a measure of "risk-adjusted CEO pay" that can be compared across companies and countries.
As an alternative experiment, Conyon, et al. (2011) propose measuring the risk premium that CEOs would demand when the CEO is directly or indirectly forced to hold a undiversified portfolio (laden with company stock and options) rather than an unconstrained portfolio with the same expected value. The risk premium is defined as the amount of riskless cash compensation that would make the CEO indifferent between holding the undiversified portfolio (with the cash) and an unconstrained portfolio (based again on various assumptions regarding CEO risk aversion and outside wealth). Risk-adjusted pay under this framework is defined as observed total compensation less the estimated risk premium.
The difference between these two approaches for measuring risk-adjusted pay is best illustrated by a CEO who receives a base salary and no other forms of compensation. Under the Hall and Murphy (2002) approach, the CEO's risk-adjusted pay is simply his (unadjusted) base salary. Under the Conyon, et al. (2011) approach, the CEO's risk-adjusted pay is his base salary less the risk premium expected for holding an undiversified portfolio.
Which of these two approaches is "right" depends, in part, on how the CEO acquired his portfolio of company stock and options. Suppose, for example, that as a condition of employment, the CEO is required to use personal funds to purchase company shares. In this case, the company will need to pay a risk premium to the CEO on top of what would otherwise be a competitive pay package to compensate for the CEO's shareholding requirement. At the other extreme, suppose the CEO's outstanding options were the result of generous grants made with only slight reductions in other components of (already competitive) pay. In this case, there is no reason for the CEO to expect to be paid an ongoing risk premium for holding an undiversified portfolio.
Hall-Murphy risk adjustment
Following Hall and Murphy (2002) , suppose that a CEO has non-firm-related wealth of w, holds a portfolio S() of company shares and options, and is granted n options to buy n shares of stock at exercise price X in T years. Assuming that w is invested at the risk-free rate, r f , and that the realized stock price at T is P T , the CEO's wealth at time T is given by: 15
If, instead of the option, the CEO were awarded V in cash that he invested at the risk-free rate, his wealth at time T would be:
Assuming that the CEO's utility over wealth is U(W), we can define the CEO's value of n options as the "certainty equivalent" V that equates expected utilities (3) and (4):
Solving (5) numerically requires assumptions about the form of the utility function,
U(W)
, and the distribution of future stock prices, f(P T ). We follow Hall and Murphy (2002) in assuming that the CEO has constant relative risk aversion , so that U(W)  ln(W) when =1, and U(W)  To solve for certainty-equivalent values, we extract BoardEx and ExecuComp data on the "total wealth" of the CEO (defined as the market value of stock held plus the intrinsic "in-the-money" value of options held at fiscal year-end). We manually collect similar data for firms in Australia, Canada, and South Africa. We make several simplifying assumptions.
First, we assume that both restricted stock and option grants have a vesting term of five years (equal to the average and median "expected term" for option grants in our US sample).
15 Cai and Vijh (2005) assume (more realistically but less tractably) that that safe wealth is invested in a portfolio of riskless assets and the market portfolio; Conyon, Core and Guay (2011) also allow investment in the market portfolio in their risk premium estimates. 16 For tractability, we assume that the distribution of future stock prices is the same whether the executive receives options or cash. If the grant provides incentives that shift the distribution, and if the shift is not already incorporated into stock prices as of the grant date, we will underestimate both the cost and value of the option.
Second, we assume that the CEO holds shares equal to total wealth divided by the year-end share price, and further assume that these shares will be held for exactly five years. 17 We find that US CEOs have substantially more wealth tied up in their firms, with stock and option holdings being on average over nine times their compensation, while the equivalent multiple is only three for non-US CEOs. Assuming that US CEOs are no less risk-averse than their foreign counterparts, these wealth data suggest larger risk adjustments for US CEOs than non-US CEOs, which in turn will reduce the estimated US pay premium. For other inputs, we assume a market risk premium of 6.5%, use local risk-free rates for sevento ten-year government bonds and, for each firm, we get the three-year dividend yield and standard deviation calculated using the last 36 months of stock returns. Finally, following
Hall and Murphy (2002), we assume that CEOs have relative risk-aversion parameters of 2 or 3, and that each CEO has "safe wealth" equal to the greater of $5 million or four times the current cash compensation.
Panel A of Table 5 shows how the observed US premium decreases when CEO pay is measured on a risk-adjusted basis following the Hall and Murphy (2002) methodology.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 replicate columns (1) and (4) from Table 3 using unadjusted pay but for a somewhat smaller sample, reflecting cases where we are unable to compute risk-adjusted pay because of lack of data on CEO wealth. The dependent variable in columns (3)-(6) is the logarithm of risk-adjusted pay, assuming constant relative risk-aversion (rra) coefficients of 2 and 3. After controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics, the implied US pay premium falls from 27% (with no risk adjustment in column (2)) to statistically insignificant premiums of 14% and 10% in columns (4) (rra = 2) and (6) (rra = 3), respectively. Importantly, in columns (3) and (5) in Table 5 we show that the US pay premium remains economically and statistically sizeable at 55% and 46% when we riskadjust pay but do not control for differences in firms' shareholder base and board structure. Table 5 , with the "US dummy" replaced by a set of 14 country dummies. The figure shows that the US estimated pay using the "certainty equivalence" approach is $2.1 million, which is statistically higher than non-US average risk-adjusted pay of $1.46 million.
Panel B of Figure 2 shows risk-adjusted pay levels per country controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics, based on the specification in column (4) of Table 5 .
CEO pay in the US is significantly less than CEO pay in the UK and Australia, and insignificantly different from CEO pay in Canada, Italy, Ireland and Switzerland.
Conyon-Core-Guay risk adjustment
Following Conyon, et al. (2011) , we now define risk-adjusted CEO pay as the dollar amount of compensation minus the riskless cash compensation the CEO would demand in exchange for holding his "total wealth" (defined as the market value of stock held plus the intrinsic "in-the-money" value of options held at fiscal year-end) for one more year instead of liquidating it. Specifically, we take a CEO that has non-firm-related wealth of w and holds a portfolio S() of company shares equal to "total wealth" divided by the year-end share price. We calculate the "certainty equivalent" V that the CEO would need to be awarded in cash to be indifferent between holding the firm shares or liquidating the firm's share holdings. We assume that w and V are invested at the risk-free rate, r f , that the realized stock price at T=1 is P 1 , and that the CEO's wealth at time T=1 is W 1  (w+V)(1+r f ) + s(P 1 ). If, instead, the CEO were able to liquidate the firm's share holdings and invest in the risk-free asset the CEO's wealth at time T=1 would be Z 1 = (w+ s(P 0 ))(1+ r f ). We then calculate the Table 5 present the results. We also consider the median risk premium for holding incentives that Conyon, et al.
(2011) estimate in their Table 5 , which corresponds to a risk premium of 5.8% of beginningof-year portfolio stock and options (which we measure as "total wealth"), in alternative to the CEO-specific calculation. In this case, we calculate risk-adjusted pay by subtracting 5.8% of CEO's "total wealth". Columns (5)-(6) of Panel B of Table 5 present the results. 18 In columns (1), (3) and (5) we find that the implied US pay premium remains economically and statistically sizeable at 72%, 51% and 41% when we risk-adjust pay but do not control for differences in firms' characteristics. After controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics we find an economically modest implied US pay premium of 30% in column (2) and statistically insignificant premiums of 18% and 0% in columns (4) and (6).
Panels C and D of Figure 2 show the international distribution of predicted 2006 CEO risk-adjusted pay for a hypothetical firm with $1 billion sales following the Conyon, et al.
(2011) method, based on the specifications in column (1) and (2) of Panel B of Table 5 .
Panel D of Figure 2 shows that, after we control for ownership and board structure, the US estimated risk-adjusted CEO pay is at par with peer executives elsewhere.
The conclusions from Table 5 (and Figure 2) are robust to the risk adjustment method as well as to alternative definitions of safe wealth, equity premiums, and option terms: under all specifications, the implied US pay premium is monotonically decreasing in risk aversion, and becomes insignificant at relatively low levels of risk aversion after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics. Calculating more precise estimates of risk-adjusted compensation for individual CEOs requires data unavailable to us, including details of CEO outside wealth and measures of individual risk aversion. Nonetheless, we consider the results in Table 5 to be consistent with Conyon, et al. (2011) 's conclusion that part of the US pay premium reflects compensating differentials for the higher risk of US pay packages. These risk adjustments, however, reduce but do not eliminate observed US pay premiums unless we also control for differences in ownership and board structures.
The result that expected pay is higher in firms with more equity-based compensation, even after adjusting for risk, is not surprising since optimal contracts must compensate for effort as well as risk. Consider the simplest agency model where the CEO produces output, y, by providing costly effort, and receives a salary plus a linear share of output: w = s + by.
Holding constant the volatility of output, the expected level of pay will increase with "b" for two reasons: a compensating differential for risk and a compensating differential for increased effort. The intuition of this result holds moving beyond effort: the benefit of providing equity-based incentives must reflect getting the CEO to take some actions that he would not have taken otherwise (e.g., downsizing, shareholder distributions, selling the firm). Unless he is truly indifferent between the various actions (in which case the equitybased pay will merely direct his activities), he will require a compensating differential for taking the actions that he otherwise would not have taken. Thus, conceptually, risk is only part of the reason expected pay will increase with more-extensive use of equity-based pay.
Moreover, the compensating differential story assumes that CEOs are pegged to their reservation utilities, as would be assumed under efficient contracting theories. The evidence from the 1990s stock-option explosion in the United States suggests that options were often layered on top of existing pay packages, and were not granted in lieu of other safer forms of compensation. Bebchuk, et al. (2002) consider this fact as evidence for their managerialpower hypothesis. But this hypothesis does not explain why the increase in pay would come in the form of equity and why it would come during a time when boards were becoming more and not less independent and CEOs were becoming less and not more powerful.
Alternatively, Murphy (2002) attributes the growth in stock options (and total pay) to executives and directors who, for a variety of reasons, did not understand (or make decisions based upon) the true opportunity cost of options, leading to oversized option grants and higher levels of pay. Murphy (2012) tries to reconcile these various paradigms, focusing on the role of government intervention and concluding that -in introducing plans that tie pay more strongly to performance as demanded by shareholders -directors routinely agree to pay more than necessary to compensate for the increased risk.
Are CEO pay determinants different for US and non-US firms?
The estimates for the US pay and equity premiums in Table 3 and 4 are based on a pooled regression where we restrict the coefficients on the firm, industry, ownership, and board controls to be the same across all countries. Table 6 explores differences across US and non-US firms in terms of the determinants of the level and structure of CEO pay.
Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) use the same specifications as in column (4) and (6), respectively, of Table 3 but without including the US dummy as a regressor. The p-values in columns (3) and (6) are based on regressions with interactions of each variable with the US dummy and indicate the significance of the difference between the US coefficients in columns (1) and (4) with the corresponding non-US coefficients in columns (2) and (5). In comparing columns (1) and (2), the relation between CEO pay and firm size and leverage is significantly stronger in the US, while the relation between CEO pay and Tobin's Q is significantly weaker. CEO pay is positively related to board size outside of the US (but not in the US), while CEOs also serving as board chairs and firms with more independents on the board of directors receive higher pay in the US (but not outside the US). In comparing columns (4) and (5), the fraction of pay delivered in the form of stock or options is positively related to board independence in the US, but not outside the US. Country fixed effects estimates (untabulated) using the sample of non-US firms are similar to those in columns (2) and (5).
The estimated coefficients in Table 6 suggest an alternative way to evaluate the US premium without restricting the regression coefficients to be the same for US and non-US firms. For each US CEO, we use that CEO's firm, industry, ownership, and board characteristics to compute the CEO's hypothetical pay (using the coefficients from the non-US regression in column (2) of Table 6 ), thus measuring the expected pay of that same CEO if he were in a non-US firm with the same characteristics. The implied US premium can be measured as the percentage difference between the actual and hypothetical pay for the US CEOs. The actual (US) pay exceeded the hypothetical (non-US) pay for 70% of the US CEOs, with an average implied US pay premiums of 40%. Similarly, we compare the hypothetical pay for non-US CEOs (using the coefficients from the US regression in column
(1) of Table 6 ) to the actual pay to estimate the implied US premium for non-US CEOs. We find that the hypothetical (US) pay exceeded the actual (non-US) pay for 59% of the non-US CEOs, with an average implied US pay premiums of 21%. These numbers suggest that our finding of a positive US CEO pay premium of 26% in column (4) of Table 3 is not driven by our assumption of equal coefficients.
We have shown that the US CEO pay premium is economically modest when we control for firm, ownership and board characteristics, but without including country-level variables routinely used in international studies of corporate governance to measure differences in the economic, law, and institutional environment of each country. The limited number of countries in our sample (14) limits the statistical degrees of freedom for reliably identifying country-level determinants of pay practices. In unreported analysis, we find that CEO equity-based pay (and total pay) is more prevalent in common-law countries (La Porta, et al. (1998) ) like the United States as well as the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Ireland and South Africa. CEO pay is also higher in countries with stronger investor protections and private control of self-dealing (Djankov, et al. (2008) ). We also consider different aspects of a country's regulatory environment. We find a positive association between CEO equity-based pay (and total pay) and the levels of compensation disclosure and director liability (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2006)); note that the United
States scores high in both indices. We find that equity-based pay is lower in countries with friendlier collective labor laws and countries where labor unions are more powerful (Botero, et al. (2004) ), such as in Continental European countries (e.g., France and Germany).
The Internationalization (and Americanization) of CEO Pay
Many of the companies in our non-US sample are large multinational corporations competing in the global market for capital, customers, and managerial talent. 
CEO pay in internationalized firms
Panel A of Table 7 shows how internationalization affects the level and structure of CEO pay in non-US companies. The regressions include the firm, ownership, and board characteristics in Table 3 , except that institutional ownership is now separated into two components: domestic and foreign institutional ownership. The regressions include four measures of internationalization: (1) foreign institutional ownership; (2) a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is included in the 1,500-firm MSCI All Country World Index (routinely used as a benchmark for global equity mutual funds and used here as a proxy for foreign investor demand); (3) foreign sales as a fraction of total sales; and (4) the number of different nationalities represented on the board of directors divided by the total board size.
Column (1) of Table 7 shows that the positive relation between CEO pay and institutional ownership documented in Table 5 is driven by foreign ownership. Overall, pay levels are positively and significantly related to all four internationalization variables. CEO pay is positively correlated to foreign institutional ownership, MSCI index membership, fraction of foreign sales and the board's international diversity. The fraction of total compensation awarded in the form of stock and options is positively related to both domestic and foreign institutional ownership; the difference in the two coefficients is not significant.
In addition, the fraction of equity pay is 5.8% higher for firms in the MSCI index; the use of equity pay is not significantly related to foreign sales or the board's international diversity. 19 In contemporary work to our paper, Gerakos, Piotroski and Srinivasan (2010) 
CEO pay in Americanized firms
Panel B of Table 7 analyzes how the level and structure of CEO pay in non-US companies is affected by explicit exposure to US capital, product, and labor markets (as opposed to exposure to "foreign" markets generally). The regressions again include the firm, ownership, and board characteristics in Table 3 . In addition, the regressions include four measures of Americanization: (1) US institutional ownership to measure the differential effect of US and non-US ownership; (2) a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is cross-listed on US exchanges, which we use as a proxy for demand by US investors; 20 (3) the total acquisitions of US companies between 1996-2005, expressed as a percentage of market capitalization, as a proxy for exposure to US product and labor markets; and (4) the fraction of directors who also sit on boards of companies headquartered in the US, as a proxy for exposure to US pay practices.
As shown in column (3) of -1=0.21) in firms cross-listed on US exchanges, and also higher for non-US companies acquiring US firms (and, presumably, a US-based work force) as well as with boards where directors also serve on the board of US firms. Column (4) shows that the use of equity pay in non-US firms is higher in firms cross-listed on US exchanges, higher in firms with more institutional ownership (but there is no statistical difference between US and non-US ownership), and higher in firms that made more US acquisitions. Equity pay, however, is not higher in firms where directors have more US board experience. Figure 4 plots the implied US premiums for subsets of non-US firms based on our four Americanization variables, defined again by estimating the US dummy variables in equations (1) or (2) after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics and using all US CEOs and subsets of non-US CEOs. The subsets for US institutional ownership, US acquisitions, and US board exposure are defined based on whether each variable is above the 75 th percentile for non-US firms, while the subsets for cross-listings are based on whether the firm is cross-listed on US exchanges. As shown in Figure 4 , the US pay premium (Panel A) is insignificant for all subsets of Americanized firms, and significantly positive for all subsets of non-Americanized firms.
The results from Figure 4 imply that the differences in the level and structure of CEO pay for US and non-US firms are driven by non-US firms with low exposure (or no exposure) to US capital, product, or labor markets. To put it differently: after controlling for firm, ownership, and board characteristics, there is no discernible difference between the pay of US CEOs and non-US firms that are cross-listed in the US, have high levels of US institutional ownership, own operations in the US, or have board members who also sit on US boards.
Why do Americanized firms adopt US pay practices?
Non-US firms may adopt US-style pay packages to compete directly for talent in the global managerial labor market. The "competitive pay package" for US executives has evolved to include large grants of stock and options and high overall levels of expected total compensation. Foreign firms attempting to attract executives in competition with equivalent US firms will need to offer packages that are competitive with US levels. This explanation for US-style pay packages in non-US firms is limited by the fact that very few companies outside the United States appoint executives from the United States (perhaps precisely because they are so costly). 21 However, while few non-US firms hire American CEOs, US Potentially more interesting are our results related to exposure to the US capital market.
In particular, we find that companies with higher US institutional investment and cross-listed on US exchanges adopt US-style packages. In a survey paper, Karolyi (2010) identifies the key trade-off that firms face when they cross-list their stocks on the U.S. stock market to have access to a larger capital market versus the additional regulatory and legal burdens that come with the listing. Stulz (1999) and the empirical work that have followed it (e.g., Doidge, et al. (2004) ) suggest that cross-listing firms benefit from "bonding" themselves to an increased level of disclosure and scrutiny in order to comply with US SEC regulations and US GAAPs. One of those mechanisms could be implementing US-style compensation packages that align executive incentives more with shareholder interests. This would predict that cross-listed firms use more equity-based pay and this could be an important factor to attract US and other foreign minority shareholders. 23 Another possibility is that CEOs of cross-listed firms would demand higher pay to compensate for the additional legal risk associated with the exposure to the US securities law (Gerakos, et al. (2010) ). However, this last channel would not predict that the increase in pay for CEOs would come in the form of increased grants of equity-based pay but rather in increases in "safe" base salary.
In a similar vein, US shareholders could demand performance-based executive compensation as a prerequisite of investment. Consistent with this explanation is our result that the adoption of US-style packages is especially likely when the directors also sit on US boards (with more direct exposure to US shareholders). A more cynical explanation -also consistent with our data -is that CEOs outside the United States use their US-based investors as an "excuse" to increase the level of their pay by adding stock and options (often without reducing base salaries or other forms of safer pay). Since our primary purpose here is to develop and document the facts, we leave their interpretation to interesting future research. Ferreira and Matos (2008) show that institutional ownership by US and other foreign institutions increases significantly following a US cross-listing.
Time Trends in the US CEO Pay Premium, 2003 -2008
In this section, we study the convergence of US and non-US pay, based on a time- Panel B of Table 8 shows year-by-year results when we control for firm, ownership, and board characteristics. The US pay premium estimate of 26% for 2006 is identical to that of column (4) Regressions in Panel B of Table 8 allow for different slope coefficients in each year and different firm samples in each year as the coverage of firms changes over time.
Therefore, it is difficult to compare US pay premium estimates across years because of different slopes and different samples. First, we examine whether the observed convergence over time in US and non-US CEOs pay level is due to changes in slopes. Panel C presents estimates of the US pay premium by year from a pooled regression using the whole sample of years, which imposes constant slopes across years. We still find that the US pay premium drops from 2003 to 2008 and conclude that the convergence in pay is not due to changes in slopes of the determinants of pay.
Second, we examine the effect of using different samples across year in the estimates of the US pay premium. Panel D of Table 8 presents estimates of yearly regressions using a sample of firms for which there are data on CEO pay (and control variables) for every year from 2003 to 2008. The constant sample consists of 898 US firms and 513 non-US firms.
The estimated US pay premium is more moderate for this set of firms in 2003 and is insignificant in more recent years, which is consistent again with a time convergence of CEO pay to US levels.
Finally, we estimate the US pay premium using both a pooled regression and a fixed sample of firms. Panel E of Table 8 presents estimates that can be directly compared across years. We observe a downward trend in the US pay premium over the sample period, and there are no significant differences between pay levels of US and non-US CEOs after 2005.
This finding suggests that it is time variation in firm characteristics that explains the decline in the US CEO pay gap.
In untabulated results, we analyze the time series of the determinants of CEO pay and conclude that an increase in institutional ownership seems to be the main factor associated with the time convergence in CEO pay levels. The average institutional ownership in non-US firms increases from 18% to 34% over the sample period. Foreign ownership is a major contributor for this increase in institutional ownership with an increase from 6% to more than 15%. Other firm and board characteristics do not exhibit significant trends. We conclude that the convergence of US and non-US CEO pay levels since 2003 seems to be associated with the convergence of ownership structures and globalization of capital markets.
Conclusion
The high pay of US CEOs relative to their foreign counterparts has been cited as evidence of excesses in US pay practices. Our results, based on the first comprehensive study of CEO pay across firms in 14 countries with mandated disclosure rules, challenge the view that the level and structure of pay for US CEOs is systematically different from the pay of non-US CEOs.
First, we show that the alleged US pay premium, after controlling for firm, ownership and board characteristics, is economically modest. The premium has declined substantially since 2003 (58%), becoming economically modest by 2006 (26%) and statistically insignificant by 2007 (2%). We establish that international differences in corporate governance in terms of companies' ownership and board structures are important in crosscountry studies of CEO pay level and mix.
Second, it is misleading to examine cross-sectional or cross-country differences in the level of pay in isolation, without also examining differences in the structure of pay. The ownership and board characteristics associated with higher pay are also those associated with a larger fraction of pay awarded in the form of stock options or restricted stock. We find that CEO pay levels and the use of equity-based pay are positively related to proxies routinely used for better governance, namely institutional ownership and independent boards.
Third, we show that risk adjustments reduce but do not eliminate observed US pay premiums unless we also control for differences in ownership and board structures. The result that expected pay is higher in firms with more equity-based compensation, even after adjusting for risk, is not surprising. Under the efficient contracting paradigm, CEOs must be compensated not only for bearing more risk but also for exerting more effort (or, more broadly, for taking actions that he would not take in the absence of equity-based compensation). Similarly, under perceived cost paradigm, in introducing plans that tie CEO pay more strongly to performance as demanded by shareholders, directors routinely agree to pay more than necessary to compensate for the increased risk. In both cases, risk alone will be insufficient to explain pay cross-sectional or international pay differences.
Finally, we find convergence toward US pay practices by non-US firms that have a higher fraction of foreign sales and shares held by foreign institutional investors and internationally diverse boards. Similarly, we find that CEO pay in non-US firms is no different (compared to US firms) in the non-US firms that are cross-listed on a US exchange, have a high presence of US institutions as shareholders, have US operations or have directors who also serve on US boards. Our results indicate that US-style equity-based compensation is increasingly exported to non-US firms that are exposed to foreign (and, particularly US) capital, product, and managerial labor markets. These findings suggest an increasingly important international managerial labor market for CEOs. Note: The figure compares estimated 2006 CEO pay for a CEO running a hypothetical firm with $1 billion in sales on an "average" industry. Panel A controls for sales and industry (as in column (1) of Table 3 ). Panel B controls for sales, industry, and firm, ownership, and board characteristics (as in column (4) of Table 3 ). The "non-US average" is weighted by the number of firms in each country. The pay composition percentages are defined as the average composition across all CEOs for each country from Risk-adjusted CEO pay ($million)
Non-U.S. average ($1.8 million)
Note: The figure compares 2006 CEO risk-adjusted pay for a CEO running a hypothetical firm with $1 billion in sales on an "average" industry. Risk-adjusted pay is estimated using the Hall-Murphy (Panels A and B) and Conyon-Core-Guay (Panels C and D) certainty equivalence approaches. Relative risk aversion is 2 and safe wealth is the maximum between $5 million and four times total pay. Panels A and C control for sales and industry (as in Panel A column (3) and Panel B column (1) of Table 5 ). Panels B and D control for sales, industry, and firm, ownership, and board characteristics (as in Panel A column (4) and Panel B column (2) of Table 5 ). Risk-adjusted CEO pay ($million) Note: The figure plots the US dummy variables in regressions similar to Table 3 column (4) for pay levels (converted into percentages) and column (6) for equity pay (in percentages), where the US sample is compared to two subsets of the non-US sample (number in brackets) based on the following measures of internationalization: MSCI Membership: "Yes" indicates that the non-US firm is a member of the MSCI All-country World Index. Foreign Institutional Ownership: "High" indicates that foreign institutional ownership is above the 75 th percentile for non-US firms. Foreign Sales: "High" indicates that firm's foreign sales (expressed as a percentage of total sales) are above the 75 th percentile for non-US firms. Board International Diversity: "High" indicates that the ratio of the number of different nationalities of directors to board size is above the 75 th percentile for non-US firms. *** , ** , * indicates that the coefficient on the US dummy on each underlying regression depicted above is significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Figure 4 Implied differences in US vs. non-US CEO pay for subsets of non-US firms based on measures of internationalization
Implied U.S. Pay Equity Premium
Cross-Listed on US Exchange US Institutional Ownership US Acquisitions Directors on US Boards * Note: The figure plots the US dummy variables in regressions similar to Table 3 columns (4) for pay levels (converted into percentages) and column (6) for equity pay (in percentages), where the US sample is compared to two subsets of the non-US sample (number in brackets) based on the following measures of Americanization: US Institutional Ownership: "High" indicates that US institutional ownership is above the 75 th percentile for non-US firms. Cross-Listed on US Exchange: "Yes" indicates that non-US firm is cross-listed on a US exchange. US Acquisitions: "High" indicates that the volume acquisitions of US companies over the prior ten years (expressed as a percentage of market capitalization) is above the 75 th percentile for non-US firms.
Directors on US Boards: "High" indicates that the fraction of directors of non-US firms who also sit on boards of US firms is above the 75 th percentile. *** , ** , * indicates that the coefficient on the US dummy on each underlying regression depicted above is significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Note: In Panel A risk-adjusted pay is estimated using the Hall-Murphy approach, defined as the amount of riskless cash compensation the CEO would exchange for his new stock and option grants, conditional on his wealth. In Panel B the risk-adjusted pay is estimated using the Conyon-Core-Guay approach, defined as the dollar amount of compensation minus the riskless cash compensation the CEO would demand in exchange for his wealth for one more year. The risk-adjusted accounting-based bonuses are assumed to be 80% of actual bonuses. The CEO's safe wealth is assumed to be the maximum between $5 million and four times total pay. Certainty equivalents are estimated numerically assuming that the CEO has constant relative risk aversion (rra) of 2 or 3, and assuming that the distribution of stock prices over the actual term of the options granted is lognormal with volatility  and expected return value (r f + (r m -r f ) - 2 /2)T, where  and  are determined using monthly stock-return data over 36 months, r f is the country-specific average yield on government securities during the year of grant, and r m -r f = 6.5% is the market risk premium. Table 3 , converted into percentages). Panel B shows estimated US dummy coefficients from year-by-year regressions controlling for sales and industry dummies, firm, ownership and board characteristics (the 2006 column for "Implied US Pay Premium" corresponds to column (4) of 
